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I.

Significant Relevance for a Nonhearsay Purpose Avoids the Exclusionary Hearsay
Rule
All evidentiary issues boil down to three questions:
(1)

Rule 401: Is the evidence relevant to the case?

(2)

Do any specific rules of evidence (e.g., the hearsay rule; privileges; or the rules
regarding subsequent remedial measures or compromise negotiations) exclude the
evidence?

(3)

Rule 403: Should the trial court exercise its discretion to exclude the evidence for
reasons of efficiency or the likelihood of unfair prejudice?

If counsel can come up with a significant, relevant, nonhearsay purpose for admitting an
out-of-court statement, the hearsay rule (Rules 802 and 801(a)-(c)) will not exclude it.
The judge will consider the effectiveness of a Rule 105 limiting instruction in
determining whether to exclude the evidence under Rule 403, but if notice to the hearer is a
significant, and not-stipulated-to, issue in the case, the evidence should come in.
When is notice, or effect on the hearer or reader, rather than “the truth of the matter
asserted,” significant? For example:
(1)

When the plaintiff alleges retaliation for her complaint about illegal activity.
Her complaint is relevant to show that the defendant knew she had
complained, rather than to prove that her complaint was true. See, e.g., Cones v.
Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Iweala v. Operational Technologies
Services, Inc., 634 F.Supp.2d 73, 83 (D.D.C. 2009).

(2)

When the plaintiff alleges that the employer was on notice that the allegedly
discriminating supervisor or co-worker had committed similar acts against
others in the past and the employer had taken inadequate curative steps.
See Green v. Administration of Tulane Educational Fund, 284 F.3d 642,
660 (5th Cir. 2002); Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2001)
(evidence of supervisor‟s sexual harassment of others was properly admitted as
relevant to issue of defendant-employer‟s deliberate indifference to and
condonation of his conduct, as well as arguably relevant to one or more Rule
404(b) purposes with regard to defendant-supervisor himself); Deters v. Equifax
Credit Information Services, Inc., 202 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2000) (evidence of
perpetrator‟s sexual harassment of another female employee than plaintiff was
properly admitted to show notice to employer); Bailey v. USF Holland, Inc., 444
F. Supp. 2d 831 (M.D. Tenn. 2006) (inadequate steps taken to remedy hostile
work environment); Cleveland v. KFC National Management Co., 948 F. Supp.
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62, 66 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (in a Title VII sexual harassment suit against a corporate
employer, in order for evidence of defendant‟s agent‟s prior sexual misconduct to
be admissible under Rule 415, the “evidence of defendant‟s agent‟s misconduct
must be both probative in that it proves corporate knowledge of similar
misconduct and it must corroborate plaintiff‟s story; otherwise, the prejudicial
effect on the jury is not substantially outweighed”).
Suppose the defendant offers to stipulate to the fact that it had notice?
Must the plaintiff and the court accept the stipulation, rather than presenting the
evidence in question?
See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (In assessing the
probative value of a particular piece of evidence, “evidentiary alternatives” may
be compared, but “with an appreciation of the offering party‟s need for
evidentiary richness and narrative integrity in presenting a case. . . .”); Briggs v.
Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 174 F.R.D. 369 (D.Md. 1997) (setting out similar
factors regarding whether the court should accept a proffered stipulation by the
defendant in a civil case) (Grimm, J.).
(3)

The defendant also may offer evidence of complaints it received about the
plaintiff, not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to show its good faith.
E.g., Velez v. ThermoKing de Puerto Rico, Inc., 585 F.3d 441, 445 n.1 (1st
Cir. 2009); Maday v. Public Libraries, 480 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2007).

II.

“Me, Too,” “He’s Done It Before,” “Not Me”: Evidence of Character and of Other
Acts

Suppose for example, that plaintiff Yoder (in the trial this morning) had tried to introduce
evidence that Yablonski had also harassed others? Or that others had at least alleged that
Yablonski had harassed them? And he denies it?
Now it‟s generally a Rule 401/Rule 404/Rule 403 issue.
Rule 406 will not apply to admit the evidence, because, even though one might say
Yablonski was “in the habit” of harassing females, his actions are not of the semi-automatic
nature embraced by Rule 406.
Note: Rule 415 will apply, to admit the evidence (subject to Rule 403) only if the prior
events were sexual assaults, as defined in Rule 413(d). See Johnson v. Elk Lake School Dist.,
283 F.3d 138, 149-59 (3d Cir. 2002) (no abuse of discretion in exclusion of evidence, in sexual
harassment suit, regarding touching of another female by defendant, when second female‟s
testimony was equivocal as to whether touching seemed intentional).
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CHARACTER EVIDENCE RULES ROAD MAP
Substantive Evidence: Who Did What

Credibility Only:

1. General rule of exclusion: the “propensity
rule” (1st parts of 404(a) & (b))

Character as to Truthfulness
1. 608(b): ”prior bad acts” for which the
witness was not convicted

2. Exceptions to propensity rule
a. 406: individual‟s repeated, specific
habit/routine of a business

2. 608(a): character witnesses re: a witness‟ or
hearsay declarant‟s truthfulness (on cross,
character witness‟s awareness of specific
instances of principal witness may be
inquired into, for limited purpose of
impeaching the character witness, 405)

b. 413-415: sexual assault defendants‟
other acts of sexual assault/child
molestation (415 applies in civil cases)
c. 412: sexual offense/harassment victims‟
prior sex with defendant

3. 609: prior convictions of the witness
4. 806: impeachment of hearsay declarants

d. 404(a)(1) & (2): criminal cases only and
only when accused opens door
Methods of Proving Character When It Is
Admissible

3. Purposes other than proving propensity
a. 404(b): limited permissible purpose,
subject to 403 (see also 105):

405: Generally, opinion or reputation
testimony OK. But see 412.
Specific acts – only under 608(b) or 609,
or under 405(b) if character is an
“essential element” of the claim or
defense, i.e., character is directly at issue.
(Otherwise, inquiry only on cross and
only to impeach a 404(a) or 608(a)
reputation or opinion witness.)

- Motive
- Intent
- Knowledge
- Opportunity
- Absence of mistake or accident
- Preparation
- Common scheme/plan
- Identity
b. 405(b): character an essential element
. . . (party must prove not merely an act,
but character of a person . . .) (applicable
in very few situations, including
negligent hiring or retention cases)
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If Yablonski‟s intent is relevant, evidence of his similar acts with regard to others may be
offered under Rule 404(b). See Zubulake v.UBS Warburg LLC, 382 F.Supp.2d 536 (S.D.N.Y.
2005). The other acts may have been either prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue at trial.
“Me, too!” The relevance of discriminatory action by other supervisors, against other
employees than the plaintiff, must be determined on a case by case basis. Sprint/United
Management Co. v. Mendolsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (2008) (ADEA case).
In making a determination whether to exclude other acts evidence under Rule 403, a
judge should consider questions of the following type:
•

How compelling is the proof of the other acts?

•

If the other events allegedly happened long ago, how probative are they?

•

Can the alleged perpetrator be expected to adequately defend against them?

•

How long would hearing the evidence on these matters take?

•

Of how much help will this evidence likely be to the jury in properly resolving the
issue before it?

See, e.g., Wyatt v. Horkeley Self Serve, Inc., 325 Fed. Appx. 488 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished)
(mem.) (evidence was properly admitted as relevant to alleged harasser‟s motive and intent, and
plaintiff‟s lack of consent); Gasper v. Ruffin Hotel Corp., 960 A.2d 1228, 1234-37 (Md. App.
2008), cert. granted, 968 A.2d 1064 (Md. 2009) (no abuse of discretion, in excluding under Md.
Rule 5-403, evidence of plaintiff‟s supervisor‟s previous termination by same employer for
sexual harassment, offered as relevant to his motive and intent in retaliatory discharge of
plaintiff, who had complained to him of sexual harassment by another employee).
III.

Other Sexual Conduct of Plaintiff

(1)
May the defendant in this morning’s trial properly prove that Ms. Yoder, the
sexual harassment plaintiff, kissed and flirted with prisoners?
Rule 412(b)(2) tips strongly against admissibility of other sexual conduct by the plaintiff.
The Rule provides:
In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual
predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under these
rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and
of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim‟s reputation is admissible
only if it has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim.
The accompanying Advisory Committee note explains:
4

Past sexual behavior connotes all activities that involve actual physical conduct, i.e.,
sexual intercourse and sexual contact, or that imply sexual intercourse or sexual contact.
* * * In addition, the word „behavior‟ should be construed to include activities of the
mind, such as fantasies or dreams. * * * This amendment is designed to exclude
evidence that does not directly refer to sexual activities or thoughts but that the proponent
believes may have a sexual connotation for the factfinder. Admission of such evidence
would contravene Rule 412‟s objectives of shielding the alleged victim from potential
embarrassment and safeguarding the victim against stereotypical thinking. Consequently,
unless the (b)(2) exception is satisfied, evidence such as that relating to the alleged
victim‟s mode of dress, speech, or life-style will not be admissible.
See Jaros v. Lodgenet Entertainment Corp., 294 F.3d 960, 965 (8th Cir. 2002) (evidence
of harassment plaintiff‟s “suggestive clothes” was excluded), abrogated on other grounds,
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
Evidence of a plaintiff‟s behavior at the defendant‟s workplace is the type most likely to
be admitted. Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637, 643-47 (8th Cir. 2006) (district court‟s
admission of plaintiff‟s workplace behavior and her statements made there while she worked
with alleged harassers was proper).
(2)

How does Rule 412 affect discovery?

The Advisory Committee Note continues:
[D]iscovery of a victim‟s past sexual conduct or predisposition in civil cases . . . will be
continued to be governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. In order not to undermine the rationale
of Rule 412, however, courts should enter appropriate orders pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(c) to protect the victim against unwarranted inquiries and to ensure confidentiality.
* * * In an action for sexual harassment, for instance, while some evidence of the alleged
victim‟s sexual behavior and/or predisposition in the workplace may perhaps be relevant,
non-work place conduct will usually be irrelevant.
See Note, Unfolding Discovery Issues that Plague Sexual Harassment Cases, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 991 (2006) (discussing, inter alia, Rule 25 court-ordered mental examinations);
Herschenroeder vg. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Laboratory, 171 F.R.D. 179 (D.Md.
1997) (Grimm, J.); Barta v. City & County of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132 (D. Hawaii 1996)
(granting motion for protective order); Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(granting motion for protective order).
(3)
May the defense circumvent the protections of Rule 412 by offering evidence of
what the alleged harasser had heard about the plaintiff, to show the alleged harasser’s absence
of invidious intent when, say, making a sexually explicit remark?

5

See United States v. Saunders, 943 F.2d 388, 391 & 392 n.1 (4th Cir; 1991) (Rule 42
plainly “manifests the policy that it is unreasonable for a defendant to base his belief of consent
on the victim‟s past sexual experiences with third persons. . . .”).
IV.
Rulings as to Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
On December 8, 2009 the United States Supreme Court held, in Mohawk Industries, Inc.
v. Carpenter, 130 S.Ct. 599 (2009), that trial court orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege
do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In the 2009 case, the employee had sued his
employer, alleging that he had been fired to prevent him from testifying about the employer‟s
hiring of illegal aliens. The trial court had ordered the employer to disclose information related
to the employee‟s pre-termination interview with the employer‟s attorney.
What are the ramifications of the Mohawk Industries decision? If the trial court finds,
for example, that a defendant employer‟s reliance on an internal investigation has waived its
attorney-client privilege, what can defense counsel do?
And what are counsel‟s ethical obligations, if counsel believes that the trial court‟s ruling
is legally incorrect? Should counsel refuse to comply, so as to be held in civil contempt? See,
e.g., In re Fannie Mae Securities Litig., 552 F.3d 814 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

.
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